Abstract: This paper examines the available data that may shed light on the carry trade in Japanese yen. We define an individual or a sector to be engaged in the carry trade if it has a short position in yen and a long position in other currencies. The tendency of large yen movements to be skewed toward appreciations is consistent with the existence of substantial carry positions, and other evidence from market prices provides some modest support for an effect from the carry trade. Data on bank loans and bond holdings by currency reveal a large apparent yen carry position of the Japanese official sector and modest carry positions in the Japanese and foreign banking sectors. The Japanese private non-banking sector has a large long foreign-currency position, but does not have a short yen position, and is thus not engaged in the yen carry trade in the aggregate. However, it is possible that exporters and investors in Japan use the derivatives markets to hedge some of their long foreign-currency exposure, with the private non-banking sector outside of Japan (including most hedge funds) likely to be taking on most of the associated carry exposure.
Introduction and Summary
The carry trade has attracted much attention in the financial press in recent months, with widely disparate evidence cited for its existence and importance. This note assesses the extent to which publicly available data can shed light on the carry trade. We focus on the carry trade in Japanese yen because the yen is the currency most commonly cited by market participants as the funding currency for carry trades, and because Japan has had the lowest interest rates in the world for more than 10 years. These low interest rates imply that carry traders would have been taking short positions in yen and long positions in all other currencies over this entire period, simplifying our attempts to measure the carry trade. We devote particular attention to October 1998 , May 2006 , and February 2007 as periods in which yen carry trades are commonly reported to have unwound rapidly.
The available data can provide only indirect evidence on the existence and magnitude of carry trades at the level of individual agents. We examine price data from the spot and options foreign exchange markets, volume and positions data from the currency futures market, and balance sheet data for broad sectors of the Japanese and rest-of-world economies that break down assets and liabilities by currencies. Available data on off-balance sheet (derivatives) positions are generally not able to yield much information on carry trade activity, which clearly imposes an important limitation on our results.
From price data, we find possible evidence for the carry trade in the asymmetric distribution of tail events in exchange rate movements. We also find evidence in the asymmetric market price of protection against yen appreciation as opposed to depreciation.
However, the price of protection did not take on especially extreme values in the two more recent putative episodes of carry trade unwinding.
Balance-sheet data breaking down assets and liabilities by currencies show that the Japanese official sector could be viewed as having the largest net carry position of the sectors analyzed. However, the motivation behind this position is clearly very different than that of a private institution and would likely not be viewed as standard yen carry trade by most analysts. The Japanese banking sector has a modest net yen carry position. The Japanese private non-banking sector has large net foreign-currency exposure, but even larger net yen exposure. As it is not leveraged on balance, we do not consider it to be a carry position; it is less exposed to exchange rate risk than a carry position. The official sector outside of Japan on balance has a small leveraged position opposite to the yen carry trade. The banking sector outside of Japan has a very small carry exposure. The private non-banking sector outside of Japan probably has greater yen assets than liabilities, and thus does not have a net carry position based on balance sheet data.
Although we have no measurements of carry positions in derivatives markets, we conjecture that the Japanese private non-banking sector (investors and exporters) may desire to hedge some of its net foreign-currency exposure. Hedging demand in the opposite direction is likely to be much smaller, reflecting the fact that Japan is running a trade surplus and has foreign assets that greatly exceed its liabilities. Thus, many of the derivatives counterparties to Japanese exporters and investors are likely to be engaged in the carry trade.
Likely candidates to hold these carry positions include hedge funds, pension funds, investment banks, charitable endowments, and individual investors, mainly outside of Japan.
Definition of Carry Trade
There is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a carry trade. At its narrowest the carry trade refers to borrowing in low-interest currencies to fund deposits in -3 --3 -high-interest currencies. At its broadest the carry trade refers to any financial transaction that increases one's high-yielding assets relative to one's low-yielding assets, even when no foreign exchange transaction is involved, such as when a household uses low-interest-bearing short-term deposits to purchase long-term bonds. The broadest definition of the carry trade could describe the behavior of any trader seeking to maximize returns on his portfolio.
We take a middle ground that views taking long positions in high-interest-rate currencies simultaneously with short positions in low-interest-rate currencies as carry trades.
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In addition to outright borrowing in low-interest-rate currencies, the carry trade could operate through currency forward and futures contracts on margin. For example, a hedge fund can enter a forward contract to buy dollars for yen at some future date. This contract has the effect of creating a short position in yen and a long position in dollars.
A common characteristic of carry trades under this definition is that they are leveraged. In general, investors use leverage to raise the expected return on their capital, but this higher return comes at the cost of greater risk. An important feature of leveraged positions is that adverse price movements draw down the collateral pledged by the investor to the lender or counterparty. When the value of the remaining collateral falls below an agreed floor, the lender or counterparty typically demands that the investor provide additional collateral or else the loan is called or the derivatives position is unwound. Unwinding of carry trades under these conditions puts positive feedback and extra volatility into market price movements. The possibility that many carry investors could be forced to cover their short positions at the same time adds to the risk already amplified by leverage. Of course, unleveraged investors may be influenced by many of the same factors that motivate leveraged investors, but, in general, unleveraged investors are less likely to cause immediate positive feedback in market prices because they do not face margin calls.
Profitability of Carry Trades
That carry trades are profitable on average has been known at least since the seminal paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983) . According to Meese and Rogoff, for industrial countries, the best predictor of next month's exchange rate is today's exchange rate. Thus, investors can make money on average by borrowing in currencies with low interest rates and investing the proceeds in currencies with high interest rates.
2 This finding is evidence against open interest rate parity, which states that expected future exchange rate changes ought to be equal to the interest rate differential, with high-interest-rate currencies expected to depreciate. In fact, most researchers have found that high-interest-rate currencies tend to appreciate against low-interest rate currencies over short and medium horizons, though the predictive power of this effect is quite small.
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The most robust empirical prediction about exchange rates is that, over periods of many years and even decades, exchange rates tend to move in line with inflation differences across countries. In other words, real exchange rates are fairly stable in the very long run.
This finding has led some researchers to argue that open interest parity may hold better in terms of long-term indexed bond yields and real exchange rates, though the evidence is weak at best.
The failure of open interest parity, at least over short horizons, remains one of the main puzzles of international finance. Carry trades, by increasing demand for high-interest 2 Not all leveraged investors in foreign exchange markets are motivated primarily by interest rate differentials. Some traders believe they can predict future exchange rate movements well enough to make profits. Of course, the data do not speak to the underlying rationale for any given market trade. 3 See Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996) 2007. 7 In the following sections we will look for similarities between these episodes and features that may be consistent with unwinding of carry trades.
Price Measures of the Carry Trade
Each of the three episodes of alleged carry trade unwinding was associated with an appreciation of the yen that was sharp, at least in terms of daily movements. Chart 1 shows that the October 1998 episode, which contained the largest ever one-day movement of the dollar-yen exchange rate, is clearly visible using monthly data. However, there are two caveats. First, the long-run average is sensitive to the sample chosen.
The real yen exchange rate is not lower than its average over the past 40 years but it is very much below its average over the past 20 years. 9 Second, real long-term interest rates in Japan are lower than in the United States. If open interest parity holds in real terms over long horizons then one should expect the real yen exchange rate to be below its long-run average.
With 10-year indexed bond yields more than 100 basis points lower in Japan than in the United States, the yen should be more than 10 percent below its long-run equilibrium in real terms, assuming that equilibrium is expected to be reached within 10 years.
As discussed above, the leveraged nature of carry trades imparts positive feedback into exchange rate movements. Moreover, this positive feedback is asymmetric, as margin calls can force the unwinding of positions when exchange rates move adversely, but there is no similar forced action when exchange rates move favorably. Thus, we should expect to find the historical distribution of exchange rate movements skewed toward appreciations of low-interest-rate currencies and depreciations of high-interest-rate currencies. 10 That expected asymmetry in exchange rate movements is mainly evident in the relative frequencies of large upward and downward exchange rate movements. Table 1 shows, for three currencies, the frequencies of daily exchange rate movements versus the dollar since 1990, split at their respective means and broken down by increasing standard deviations.
European and U.S. interest rates have been relatively similar over the past 20 years; thus we would not expect carry trades to be a significant factor between these currencies. Table 1 shows that for the euro-dollar exchange rate (and that of the German mark before 1999),
there is little asymmetry in the distribution of small and large movements. For the yen, which has had consistently lower interest rates since the early 1990s and is a common funding currency for carry trades, the frequency of tail events is clearly higher for appreciations than for depreciations. For the Australian dollar, a relatively high-interest-rate currency, tail events are more common for depreciations than for appreciations. While we cannot directly attribute all these tail events to the impact of carry trades, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that carry positions are important and that they are more fragile and more subject to positive feedback than non-carry positions. A more systematic way to examine this asymmetry is to correlate the level of volatility with the change in the exchange rate. If yen appreciations are associated with higher volatility than yen depreciations, this correlation should be negative. 12 Chart 3 shows that implied volatility indeed is generally negatively correlated with changes in the dollar-yen exchange rate. However, measured realized volatility has little systematic correlation with the direction of exchange rate changes, perhaps because the skewness in the distribution of exchange rate movements owes to a relatively small number of tail events.
Many commentators have pointed to risk reversals based on options on exchange rates as evidence of carry trades. Riskless arbitrage ensures that a fully hedged carry position yields zero excess returns; the cost of hedging equals the return from carry. However, it is often possible to purchase protection against extreme losses and still retain positive expected profits. To do this, a yen carry trader purchases a call option on yen that is far out of the money. Thus, we might expect that as more yen carry positions are held, the price of protection against yen appreciation should rise relative to the price of protection against yen depreciation, particularly for options that are significantly out of the money. The relative price of protection is known as a risk reversal.
Chart 4 shows risk reversals for dollar-yen and dollar-euro based on the differences in prices between significantly out-of-the-money call options and significantly out-of-themoney put options. The risk reversal on dollar-euro is generally close to zero, consistent -10 -with a low level of carry trades in this currency pair. The risk reversal on yen was close to zero during the summer of 1998. This was a time of strong downward pressure on the yen, which many observers attributed to the carry trade. The price of protection against yen appreciation did not increase until after the yen appreciated sharply in early October, just when carry trades were supposedly unwinding. Risk reversals also widened immediately after the yen appreciations of May 2006 and February 2007, but were not large in the months prior to these dates when carry trades were purportedly building up.
One interpretation of these results is that risk reversals reflect primarily the changing risk appetites or risk perceptions of market participants (potentially including carry traders)
rather than changing shares of carry versus non-carry traders. The fact that prices rise more for protection against yen appreciation than depreciation suggests that it may be the risk perceptions of the carry traders that are fluctuating most strongly. negatively correlated with these currencies recently, and the correlations also turned negative around October 1998, but the negative correlations around these three episodes are not large either in absolute terms or relative to other periods.
Volume Measures of Carry Trade
The two main channels of the carry trade are through 1) borrowing in low-interest currencies and investing the proceeds in high-interest currencies, which we term the "canonical carry trade;" and 2) taking on leveraged positions in derivatives markets, particularly through currency futures and forward contracts, which we term the "derivatives carry trade." The realized profit from either channel is identical, reflecting the fact that major derivatives dealers hedge forward contracts by borrowing and lending in the interbank market. Equations (1)- (3) demonstrate the equality of returns from both channels of the carry trade.
( 13 Equation (2) defines the profit from the derivatives carry trade as equal to the difference between the value of foreign currency at closing (e 1 ) and the price paid in the forward contract (f). Equation (3) is the arbitrage condition governing the price of the forward contract in the interbank market (also known as covered interest rate parity). A derivatives dealer (most of whom participate in the interbank market) can hedge his forward sale of foreign currency (f) by buying foreign currency in the spot market (e 0 ). His opportunity cost is the domestic interest rate (i 
Canonical Carry Trade
Data on financial stocks and flows allow us to say a bit more about the size and location of canonical carry trades as opposed to derivatives carry trades. Nevertheless, we are greatly restricted by the aggregate nature of the data. Gross stocks of yen-denominated liabilities provide an upper bound to the carry trade, but this bound is likely to be so far above the level of borrowing in yen for the carry trade as to be nearly useless. Ideally, we would like to identify carry trades according to whether the individual or institution is simultaneously net short yen and net long other currencies. But the best we can do is to see whether broad sectors by country are net short yen and net long other currencies.
We define a carry position to exist for a sector as a whole if the sector has yendenominated debt liabilities that exceed its yen-denominated debt claims and it has foreigncurrency-denominated debt claims that exceed its foreign-currency-denominated debt liabilities. This is what we mean by a net yen short, net foreign-currency long position. Note that we are excluding equity and real estate claims and liabilities. 16 The size of the carry position is given by the smaller of the net yen short position and the net foreign-currency long position. If a sector is long in both yen and foreign currencies, or if it is short in both yen and foreign currencies, then under this definition it does not have a carry position. If it is long yen and short foreign currency, then it has a negative carry position. The country breakdown we choose is Japan versus the rest of the world. The sectors we examine are official, bank, and private non-bank. At the outset we note that Japan has had large current account surpluses for more than 20 years. As of end-2006 Japan had net debt claims on the rest of the world valued at $2.2 trillion. 17 Japan's gross debt claims were $3.7 trillion and gross debt liabilities were $1.5 trillion. It is likely that most of the claims were in foreign currencies and most of the liabilities were in yen. Thus, Japan in the aggregate fits our definition of a yen carry trader, with the rest of the world on balance taking the opposite position (long yen, short other currencies) but we do not have sufficient information on the currency breakdown of these assets to calculate the net carry position.
The Japanese official sector, on our definition, has an enormous carry position. It holds $875 billion in foreign currency assets that are funded entirely by yen liabilities as it has essentially no foreign-currency liabilities. 18 (Indeed, the government of Japan has issued yen liabilities far in excess of its foreign exchange assets.) However, it is important to note that the motivations of the Japanese official sector are very different from those of private investors. In particular, the Japanese government is not subject to margin calls and probably has a greater tolerance for risk than private investors.
The official sector outside of Japan has assets that are reported to be denominated in yen of $106 billion and assets whose currency is not reported of $1.7 trillion; it is believed 17 International investment position data are from the website of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, www.mof.go.jp. 18 IMF IFS database. Position reported as of December 2006. that the vast majority of the latter figure is denominated in dollars and euros. 19 The extent of yen borrowing by the official sector in the rest of the world is not known, but is likely to be small. Non-yen borrowing by this sector, of course, is enormous. On balance, the official sector outside of Japan is probably taking a leveraged position in the opposite direction of the yen carry trade of at least $106 billion, but probably not much more than $106 billion.
Again, the motivations behind this position are very different from those of the private sector.
According to the BIS locational banking statistics, the banking sector outside of Japan In the BIS locational banking statistics and in the Japanese balance of payments statistics, each country's banking sector includes all banking offices in that country, including offices of foreign banks. Data on financial institutions accounts from the Bank of Japan show that as of December 2006 offices of foreign banks in Japan had liabilities to Japanese residents of $299 billion (total liabilities minus liabilities to foreign affiliates) but there is no information on the currency denomination of either the liabilities or the assets held by these offices. Net funding of overseas affiliates from foreign bank offices in Japan was fairly small, at $19 billion. 23 These data are from the balance of payments statistics, which do not include trust accounts or investment trusts (mutual funds) managed by banks. The BIS locational banking statistics, which include such accounts, show total foreign-currency assets of nearly $1100 billion as of December 2006. In the BIS data, the liabilities corresponding to these trust assets are typically reported in yen. However, the net worth of banks is not directly exposed to fluctuations in the value of trust assets because the value of the claims of the ultimate holders of the trusts moves with the value of the underlying assets. 24 Of this $230 billion, roughly half reflects deposits of foreign exchange reserves by the official sector and half reflects net claims by the private non-banking sector in Japan. 25 The banking sector's non-debt claims (equity and real estate) roughly equal its non-debt liabilities (net worth) so that positive net foreign-currency debt claims imply negative net yen debt claims. 26 The CPIS data include claims of Japanese banks but exclude non-security debt claims such as loans and deposits. More than 80 percent of the non-banking claims consist of debt securities. As of year-end 2005, 74 percent of the CPIS claims were denominated in foreign currency. The second column of Table 2 shows the private non-banking sector's net foreigncurrency claims on the banking sector. The third column shows that total net foreigncurrency claims of the Japanese private non-banking sector are around $1.3 trillion. This position cannot be considered a carry trade, however, because the private non-banking sector has an even larger net long position in yen assets, as most of the $4.6 trillion of Japanese public sector bonds are held by this sector.
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Finally, Charts 9 and 10 present securities flow data which are often cited by observers writing on the carry trade. These data have a strong seasonal pattern which we have removed to permit analysis. The primary feature of both securities inflows and outflows is their volatility. Debt outflows (Chart 9) reversed briefly around or just before the times of the three episodes of hypothesized carry trade unwinding (October 1998 , May 2006 , and February 2007 . 28 But these reversals were not unusually large. Inflows (Chart 10) jumped up in all three episodes, but these increases were large only for the most recent episodes. Overall, it is not clear that these data have much to say about the carry trade. 
Conclusions
Data on market prices can provide some limited and indirect information on the carry trade. The yen has appreciated abruptly in periods that some market participants believe to have been associated with a net unwinding of yen carry trades, and some high-interest-rate currencies have depreciated sharply at those times. However, to attribute these exchange rate movements to the carry trade may reflect an ex post search for a plausible explanation. More systematic evidence derives from the observed asymmetry in the distribution of tail events between low-interest-rate and high-interest-rate currencies, which is consistent with the existence of carry positions. Also suggestive is the fact that market participants are typically more willing to pay for protection against yen appreciation than against yen depreciation, which is consistent with the view that short-yen positions are dominated by speculators and long-yen positions are dominated by hedgers. The price of protection jumps more after yen appreciation than after yen depreciation, suggesting that carry traders are spooked by losses.
However, there is no tendency for the price of protection to rise in periods when carry trades are purported to have been rising (just before the episodes of unwinding).
Data on market volumes can provide rough estimates of the sizes of net positions by broad sectors through balance-sheet assets and liabilities. However, there is essentially no useful data on positions through derivatives markets. The balance-sheet data do not exhibit large movements in positions around periods that have been linked to carry trade behavior in the financial press. However, as with the equity markets, it may be that developments in the carry trade primarily determine the prices at which assets are held, rather than the quantities.
Balance-sheet data identify canonical carry-trade-like positions of roughly the following magnitudes. (See Table 3 .) The Japanese official sector has a net yen carry position of $875 billion. The Japanese banking sector has a net yen carry position of $40 billion. The Japanese private non-banking sector has positive net foreign-currency assets of around $1.3 trillion. However, the position of the private non-banking sector cannot be considered a carry position, because the sector is not leveraged; it is net long yen assets by an even larger magnitude. 29 The official sector outside of Japan has a net leveraged position in the opposite direction of the yen carry trade, but not by much more than $100 billion. The banking sector outside of Japan has a very small yen carry position. The private non-banking sector outside Japan most likely does not have a net yen carry position on its balance sheet.
There are no published data on the magnitude of the yen carry trade through derivatives markets. As every derivatives contract creates two parties with opposite positions, one can explore the derivatives carry trade through either the demand side or the supply side. Possible sources of supply are Japanese exporters and Japanese households holding foreign-currency assets, both of whom may wish to hedge the value of their foreigncurrency claims. 30 Sources of demand for yen carry positions include hedge funds, pension funds, investment banks, charitable endowments, and individual investors. Most of the demand for the derivatives yen carry trade likely arises in the private non-banking sector outside of Japan.
29 Much attention lately has been devoted to the rise of foreign exchange margin trading by Japanese households. Typical estimates of gross open retail foreign exchange positions in Japan are well under $100 billion, so that this sector is not short yen in the aggregate. However, some individual investors may be short yen. 30 Given Japan's large trade surplus, it is plausible that hedging demand from Japanese exporters exceeds hedging demand in the opposite direction from foreign exporters to Japan. Similarly, given that Japanese holdings of foreign assets greatly exceed foreign holdings of Japanese assets (even after netting out foreign exchange reserves) it is plausible that hedging demand from Japanese investors exceeds hedging demand in the opposite direction from foreign investors. 
vis-a-vis Year
Cross-Border* Japanese Banks Total equity or real estate. ** Position opposite to yen carry trade --long yen and short foreign currency. Based on foreign exchange reserves data reported to the IMF.
Of reserves for which currency breakdown is available, $106 billion are in yen. Of reserves for which no currency breakdown is available only a small fraction is assumed to be yen.
Japan

Rest of World
Official Sector 875~ -150** Banking Sector 40 10
Private, Non-banking Sector 0 0
